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Abstract: The paper studies a cooperative game, which is be-
ing played among the firms, involved in furniture industries, belong-
ing to the same cluster. Due to the increased competition at the
local and global levels, cooperation among the business entities is
practically the only way to survive in the cluster. Consequently, a
cooperative game model is proposed for the firms, associated in a
vertical channel, where its performance indices are measured by one
of its indicators of competitiveness at an entrepreneurial level versus
the value of the cluster itself. As a case study, a competitive value
analysis is done for the Colombian furniture cluster by indicating the
characteristics and existing conditions of the cluster in the depart-
ment of Atlantico in Colombia. Moreover, this paper analyzes and
establishes an optimal feasible solution of cooperative game among
the principal firms using Shapley value method.
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1. Introduction
In competitive business environment, the organisation of a cluster, involving
a group of companies operating in design, production, distribution, marketing
and consumption of goods and services, aims to improve productivity through
the articulation of the sectoral advantages and the competitive development of
their products and processes. Clusters influence mainly the competitiveness of
the organizations belonging to a given sector and increase the productivity and
the effectiveness of the channel members, who enhance and stimulate marketing
as well as the creation of new businesses and ability to innovate with regard
to effective strategies (Valderrey et al., 2012). Garnica and Rivero (2004) men-
tion that clusters arise by associative factors, including the cooperation among
small enterprises, highlighting especially the context, in which neither factor
dominates permanently. Being a part of a cluster, allows the respective com-
panies to operate in a more productive way and encourages competition and
cooperation. As a result, each member is able to benefit at a larger scale. How-
ever, it is necessary to implement strategic analysis to strengthen the entire
chain, which leads to the generation of competitive advantages.
A supply chain (SC) is defined as multiple interrelated transactions among
companies (Cardenas-Barron and Porter, 2013; Trevino-Garza et al., 2015;
Panda, 2014; Sarkar, 2013; Sarkar and Majumder, 2013; Modak et al., 2016).
Generally, in fact, an SC integrates its suppliers and providers with the cus-
tomers (Lin and Hsieh,2012). An integrated SC includes among its effects
cost reduction, improved processes, better quality and an increased value added
scheme (Richey et al., 2008). This paradigm emphasises the transfer of informa-
tion among the members of the SC, which helps to enhance and increase infor-
mation sharing, demand, inventory, order status and production programmes.
Then, the cooperative game theory studies the relationships in the chain (Slick-
ker and van der Nouweland, 2001), while pursuing three issues, namely: (1)
the forming coalitions, (2) how they should divide the expected result, and
(3) whether this relationship is stable and robust (Nagarajan and Sosic, 2008).
Cooperative game theory studies the selection, identification, adoption and as-
signment of the expected results, and can be also classified into coalitional al-
liances or negotiation games. The interest of our proposed research is to focus
on coalitional games. It is currently observed that the value of a coalition in
an environment of supply chain depends on its interaction, with the resulting
competitive outcomes being compared to other chains. In this context, the
members of an SC evaluate their objective function and participate in the chain
only when the payoff is not less than the target level of the expected profit
within the coalition. Now, the following questions are pertinent in the field:
which is the minimum expected value? how could it be determined from an
existing competitive dynamics in business today?
The proposed study corresponds to the need of clusters to cooperate effec-
tively among the members and to propose the strategies for the companies that
conform to accession to and taking advantage of such cooperation agreements,
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without leaving aside the competitive dynamic behavior that characterizes the
entities here considered. To achieve this goal, a cooperative game among the
companies along the vertical dimension of the value chain is proposed here. It
uses the Shapley value as the solving methodology for improving the competi-
tiveness of the cluster, in which the respective companies belong. A case study
presents the analysis of competitiveness of the furniture cluster in Atlantico,
Colombia, this case study demonstrating that it is possible to measure feasibil-
ity of cooperation between the member companies of a definite cluster in order
to strengthen them at the individual as well as group level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the issues
of business competitiveness and clusters, and cooperation in the SC. Then, the
general model of cooperative game theory is applied to supply chains, especially
for the case of clusters. Section 3 proposes the concrete model, which is imple-
mented in the case study. Section 4 provides the description of the case study.
Numerical evidence is presented in Section 5. The results show the conditions,
under which it would be possible to cooperate, and the contributions of the
respective companies within the cluster, using the Shapley value. Conclusions
are provided in Section 6.
2. Literature review
Game theory is mainly classified into theory of non-cooperative and coopera-
tive games. Both kinds of models have been used in the context of the SC.
Various tools of game theory have been applied to the SCM (Supply Chain
Management: Bartholdi and Eda, 2004; Cachon, 2004; Cachon and Lariviere,
2001; Cachon and Kok, 2007; Cachon and Netessine, 2004) where the newsboy
problem is used mainly to demonstrate the applicability of the game theory to
the SCM for both static and dynamic environments. The importance of game
theory for such analysis of SCM arises from the very nature of relations among
the members of the chain, in which they are independent and none of them
has a completely controlling power over the chain. Padula and Dagnino (2007)
have applied cooperative approaches to optimize the SCM games considering
competition. A coalitional game considers n players with 2n-1 coalitions. Each
coalition member takes part in the overall result of the coalition, which is inde-
pendent of the results generated by the other players, who are not a part of the
coalition. In this system, the players are included into the coalition, in which
they desire to belong. It is a dynamic process and provides a better result than
the respective non-cooperative situations. The set of feasible coalitions depends
on the problem, with appropriate consideration of the restrictions that specify
the concrete problem conditions.
Now, letN = 1, 2, . . . , n be the set of n players, and Si, where i = 1, . . . , (2
n−
1), be the set of coalitions, while vi(Si) represents the value for each coalition
Si. The function v is referred to as the characteristic function of the cooper-
ative game, and is identified with the pair of (N, v). The coalition structure
S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} is formed out of the possible coalitions, which obey the
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following conditions (Owen,1995):
Sj 6= ∅ (1)
Si ∩ Sj = ∅ (2)
⋃
Sj = N. (3)
Besides these three conditions, a fourth condition is contemplated, implying
that the value of an empty set is 0, v(∅) = 0. Then, upon applying the super
additive function, Eq. (4) provides the fourth condition
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) ∀ S, T ⊆ N, (4)
such that S ∩ T = ∅.
The above restriction is important for determining the total payoff of a coalition
called a grand coalition. Given that xi is a vector coalition of player i, which
belongs to a coalition of N players, there must be three important principles
that are satisfied by the coalition formation: the principle of efficiency (Eq. 5),
the principle of individual rationality (Eq. 6), and the principle of collective
rationality (Eq. 7). The Equations (5), 6 and 7 are as follows:
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N) (5)
xi ≥ v({i})∀ i ∈ N (6)
∑
i∈S
xi = v(S) for S ⊂ Tk ∈ T. (7)
The well known solution concepts in cooperative game theory are, first of all,
the core of the game (Gillies, 1959), the stable set (von Neumann and Morgen-
stern, 1944), the kernel value (Davis and Maschler, 1965), the trading value, the
Aumann-Maschler (Aumann and Maschler, 1964), and the Shapley value (Lutz
et al., 2012), just to quote the most important ones. Although the first two
solution concepts are easier to model, they involve a definite difficulty. Namely,
they do not always reach the settlement of a non-empty set as the game analysis
is framed in a relationship of dominance. However, the value of the coalitional
game, proposed by Shapley, leads to an equilibrium and a balance of the game,
enabling to determine whether or not the game has a feasible solution. The




(S − 1)!(n− S)!
n!
(υ(S)− v(S − {i})). (8)
In the literature, these solutions are applied to cooperative supply chain games
in multiple ways under several models and methods of solution. In the model
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of Granot and Soste (2005), a multi-stage decentralized system among multiple
retailers to share inventory information at the stage of cooperation suggests that
the Shapley value encourages retailers to share their surplus earnings. Raghu-
nathan (2003) considered a chain composed of one manufacturer and n retailers
with correlated demand and applied the Shapley value to analyze the expected
value of manufacturers and retailers to share information on demand. Lin and
Hsieh (2012) studied a cooperative game between chains in an environment of
perfect competition under a duopolistic market, using an algorithm called itera-
tive diagonalization algorithm. Leng and Parlar (2009) addressed the three layer
supply chain, comprising the manufacturer, distributor and retailer, through a
cooperative game, for the allocation of the cost savings in a scheme in which
information is shared. Huang et al. (2012) investigated an integrated model
of multiple levels, in which the optimal provider is selected, where decisions,
regarding sales prices and the quantity in inventory are taken into account.
Zamarripa et al. (2012) improved the SCM by considering the competitive be-
havior as a source of uncertainty in decision-making at the tactical level, in the
SC, in which players compete for demand in various scenarios.
In summary, there exists a significant volume of research on SC, where game
theory is applied for both cooperative and non-cooperative schemes. However,
there are only few studies that involve the value of competitiveness and analysis
tools in decision making. This same concept relates to the measure of compe-
tence of individual firms, implying non-cooperation among them. At the cluster
level, competitiveness inevitably involves cooperation among entities. This pro-
vides an opportunity to of filling a gap in the literature, and proposing a novel
cooperative game approach for cluster formation and evolution in supply chains.
3. The proposed model
In the proposed model, cooperation among the entities in the supply chain can
be studied along the vertical or horizontal dimension, as shown in Fig. 1. In
the case of a cluster, the management of the supply chain is performed by a
central decision maker, who proposes improvement strategies at any level of the
chain. In this case, each member of the chain is aligned according to the same
objective, and takes part in the competition as an independent agent.
In order to achieve competitiveness in the chain, it is necessary to establish
the objective or objectives that need to be reached in terms of the cluster. It is
possible for a cluster to be competitive and this calls for the development of a
project or strategies that are appropriately embedded in the international mar-
ket. In this context, the performance indicators or utilities must be reflected as
an objective. In cooperative game theory this objective is modelled as the char-
acteristic function (v) of the game. Here, strategies are generated in the chain
by the contribution from each company. This model includes a model of coop-
erative game that manages the structure of these contributions to the cluster.
In clustering, the companies are able of getting involved as a coalition within
the same link and of contributing to the competitiveness of the link. Also, the
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Figure 1. Cooperation schemes in the supply chain
link must be aligned with the objective of the cluster to secure competitiveness.
Let ni (i = 1, . . . , n) be the number of enterprises belonging to a link i in the
supply chain of a cluster. A cooperative game (ni, vi) is defined for each link i,
and cooperation among the agents represents each of the links. This is achieved
through the centralized optimization of the supply chain, whose overall objec-
tive translates into one or more indicators of the competitiveness of the cluster,
and is directly related to the overall objective of the cluster. Such a model is
dubbed the multi-link cooperation in the supply chain, and it is presented in
Fig. 2.
In order to solve this model, Shapley value is applied according to Eq. (8),
owing to which calculation is done of the contributions of each company to
the characteristic function of the respective game (vi) and the feasibility of
cooperating in the chain is validated.
4. Case study of competitiveness in furniture industry
4.1. Global analysis
In furniture industry, there are many units that design, manufacture, market,
distribute and install the respective objects. These objects serve comfort or
household needs, and include such items as beds, tables, chairs or armchairs,
dining room furniture, bedrooms, desks, garden furniture, etc. These utensils
are made out of different materials, such as wood, metal or plastic. Also, input
suppliers of accessories that complement the manufacture of furniture, include
producers of such items and materials as foams, fittings, upholstery, etc. In this
system, conditioned wood sawmills are of relevance for the respective industries.
According to the statistics, given by CSIL (Center for Industrial Studies), inter-
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Figure 2. Multi-echelon model of cooperation in the supply chain
national trade in furniture represents about 1% of world trade in the processing
industry and consumption today totals approximately $ 410 billion at factory
gate, this figure having doubled in the last 10 years. Among the major produc-
ing countries are China with 31% of the global value, followed by the United
States, Italy and Germany. Reports from the Research and Development Labo-
ratory - NOSIS, in 2012 China has increased its exports to US up to $ 45 billion,
compared to $ 25 billion in 2011 (Tian et al., 2014). On the other hand, total
import value in the furniture industry worldwide exceeds $ 190 billion. The
industry has the experience of many important changes worldwide, especially
in the late 1990s, when the distribution and marketing of furniture was so frag-
mented that many manufacturers would sell their products to many stores by
relatively small quantities (see Fig. 3). Here, rivalry between competitors was
relatively low, and there was a higher distribution margin. By early 2000s, the
emergence of structured network stores left behind many small establishments.
Since then, today’s businesses focus on the distribution channels and market-
ing. Therefore, departmental stores have become more important. Today, the
marketing power of the big stores has driven down the manufacturer’s margins
(Fig. 3) and increased competition in the industry.
4.2. Cluster analysis for Atlántico, Colombia
The Atlantico Department is located in the northern region of Colombia, South
America, on the west bank of the Magdalena River, 15 km from its mouth in
the Caribbean Sea. Having the capital city of Barranquilla, the department
consists of 23 municipalities with the total population of 2,344,140 inhabitants.
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Figure 3. Global changes in the furniture industry
Today, it is the most populous department in the Colombian Caribbean Coast
(Fig. 4).
The cluster of furniture industries of the Atlantico department is composed
of more than 150 companies, which carry out design, production, distribution,
marketing, and consumption of goods and services, related to furniture sup-
ply chain. As a cluster, they have the objective of improving the productiv-
ity through collaborative industrial activities, competitive product development
and processes. According to the database of the Barranquilla Chamber of Com-
merce, these companies, 186 in number, can be classified into the following
economic activities:
• Wood Manufacturers and Suppliers: 9
• Furniture Manufacturers: 94
• Marketers: 62
• Specialised Training and Research Centers: 5
• Services: 6
• Governmental Bodies: 2
• Promotion Agencies: 3
• Regulatory Bodies: 2.
As a way to improve the current operation of the furniture business in the At-
lantico, an analysis has been conducted, following the work of Malawski (2002).
Most of the respective technical material is strictly confidential, yet an overall
analysis can be made public to disseminate the bigger picture of the cluster’s
role in the furniture business around the world. After obtaining information
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Figure 4. Atlántico department, Colombia
from all of the businesses in this cluster with the help of the Chamber of Com-
merce, analysis was performed. As a part of the analysis, the supply chain is
visualized in detail in Fig. 5.
In this cluster, most of the furniture is made up of wood. Yet, its geo-
graphical area is not specialized in the production of the raw material. In the
case of the accessories of the final product, most of the suppliers are not locals.
They are from other regions of the country or can even come from the global
market. Here, China is the leading supplier for most of the accessories used in
the furniture of Atlantico. It has also been observed that the manufacturing
processes in the cluster are conducted under informal or craft techniques. This
depends largely on the work and expertise of carpenters, joiners and painters.
However, there is little use of large machinery and technology, involving a very
low participation of this link in the furniture supply chain.
5. Numerical example
On the basis of information, compiled by the Chamber of Commerce of Barran-
quilla, the data on the major suppliers and manufacturers have been obtained.
For better convenience in evaluating the cooperation within the chain in this
article, only the results of cooperation related to the vertical dimension are
presented and an analysis of the possible cooperation along the horizontal di-
mension is considered. In Tables 1 and 2 the data collected from the leading
suppliers and manufacturers, making up the cluster, are presented.
In the context of assessing the level of cooperation among the companies,
which form each of the links, a strategy to strengthen the link is identified.
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Figure 5. Supply chain in the Atlántico department cluster *Information Sys-
tems
In the case of the providers, it is necessary to calculate the maximum money
amount, expected to be invested in the production process of each company, so
that the prices offered to their clients (manufacturers) could be competitive. In
the case of the manufacturers, investment in skilled labour is essential for taking
part in the competition as to offering the world-class furniture. An opportunity
to use the state funds to strengthen the cluster is analyzed for both these links.
So as to follow the strategy of using the state funds, companies must meet the
following requirements:
• Net working capital: it must be at least equal to 10 % of the total project
value.
• Liquidity ratio (LR): it must be greater than or equal to 1.
• Debt Ratio (DR): it must be less than or equal to 70 % (in the case of
suppliers) and 80 % (in the case of the manufacturers).
To leverage higher revenue, companies need to cooperate. The level of coop-
eration, measured in millions of Colombian Pesos, corresponds to the amount of
funding received, which is 10% of the net working capital of all companies, in-
volved in the coalition. This would be the characteristic function of each game.
The characteristic values for the suppliers (v1) and manufacturers (v2) are as
follows:
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Table 1. General information on the suppliers in the furniture cluster (mil-
lion of Colombian Pesos). Source: Database of the Chamber of Commerce of
Barranquilla 2013
Current Assets Current liabilities Total liabilities Equity
P1 632 106 475 156
P2 1,033 410 513 278
P3 34,153 9,804 16,849 3,302
P4 7,824 920 3,063 4,762
P5 749 270 428 321
P6 10,752 4,889 4,889 5,862
Table 2. General information of the manufacturers in the furniture cluster
(million of Colombian Pesos). Source: Database of the Chamber of Commerce
of Barranquilla 2013
Current Assets Current liabilities Total liabilities Equity
F1 3,853 1,111 3,011 841
F2 1,004 682 682 321
F3 1,590 945 1,245 346
F4 9,107 3,387 5,680 796
F5 1,756 954 1,020 736
F6 871 377 377 236
v1 =
{





0.1 ∗ Net working capital (Sj), ifLR ≥ 1 andDR ≤ 0.8
0, otherwise
. (10)
These indicators for suppliers and manufacturers, calculated for the actual
local conditions, are shown in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
Note that in the case of suppliers, companies P1 and P3 would not be able to
apply the state support funds by themselves, because of the high levels of debt.
Later, coalitions, which are generated among different companies, must also
meet the conditions set forth above. In the case of manufacturing companies,
the results show that only one company, F3, could not participate with their
own resources. At a general level, one can also see that companies are not
competitive as individuals, and so it is necessary to consider cooperation.
Table 5 shows the results for the suppliers. Here, the Shapley value indicates
the amount of investment that would correspond to each entity in an investment
project, financed by the state. Results indicate that P6 has the largest share
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Table 3. Financial indicators of suppliers
Net working capital
(millions of pesos -
Colombian currency)
Liquidity ratio Debt ratio
P1 525 5.94 0.75
P2 623 2.52 0.65
P3 24,349 3.48 0.84
P4 6,904 8.51 0.39
P5 479 2.77 0.57
P6 5,862 2.20 0.45
Table 4. Financial indicators of manufacturers
Net working capital
(millions of pesos)
Liquidity ratio Debt ratio
F1 2,741 5.94 0.75
F2 321 2.52 0.65
F3 646 3.48 0.84
F4 5,720 8.51 0.39
F5 802 2.77 0.57
F6 494 2.20 0.45










P1 350,09 35,01 0 100%
P2 536,72 53,67 62,31 -7%
P3 9,979,21 997,92 0 100%
P4 5,771,08 577,11 690,43 -9%
P5 1,124,63 112,46 47,86 40%
P6 20,898,06 2,089,81 586,25 56%
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F1 2,424,12 242,41 267,12 -5%
F2 435,75 43,57 28,51 21%
F3 438,31 43,83 44,59 -1%
F4 2,143,28 214,33 0 100%
F5 4,083,15 408,31 50,15 78%
F6 526,21 52,62 39,37 14%
in the cooperation scheme and would be willing to cooperate with the smaller
companies. The strategic condition for this company does not exclude it from
the coalition. On the contrary, P6’s contributions are enhanced when entering
the coalition with 56 %. The total sum of the Shapley value in terms of the
net working capital would correspond to the grand coalition value (the coalition
among all the players, i.e. the entities belonging to the link). This involves
sharing a total of 38,659,789,320 Colombian Pesos in net working capital. As-
suming funds are available, the companies would be able to finance the total
of 3,865,978,932 Colombian Pesos (10% of the total net working capital). For
manufacturers, a similar situation is observed. The results, presented in Table
6, indicate that companies F4 and F5 are the most competitive, having an in-
centive to cooperate, which finds a reflection in the distribution of the funded
capital. This demonstrates weak stability of these channel members, with the
exception of company F1, which is also competitive, but its contribution is not
improved by the coalition. The total amount of the contributions reaches the
value of 1,005,081,409 Colombian Pesos, which would be exploited to achieve
technical training and innovation regarding the production process for each com-
pany of the cluster. In making this a reality, manufacturers could be just one
step away from becoming the world class in the furniture industry.
The results of implementation of the cooperative game model provide the
companies with a hint on the fair share concerning their participation in a
cooperative setting, but further studies could indicate the actual degree of their
willingness to participate in such a cooperation scheme. With the exception of a
few businesses, results suggest that cooperation is the right way to go on, both
for the suppliers and the manufacturers, in order to ensure competitiveness of
the cluster at the national and international levels.
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6. Conclusions and future research
Cooperation in clusters is an interesting topic among researchers as well as
practitioners around the globe, because of its utility in industrial business. As
a supporting framework, game theoretic models aim to address the strategic
alliances and coalitions among the companies, aiming to generate significant
additional benefits among the channel members. The proposed cooperation
model is validated through the implementation of one of the strategies encoun-
tered in the cluster analysis of furniture industries. This strategy involves the
use of the state funds, which are invested in innovation practices for both the
manufacturers and suppliers. A selected number of companies from among both
manufacturers and suppliers are considered to definitely profit in the game the-
oretic model, as shown by the calculation of the Shapley value for the possible
coalitions of the channel members.
Our findings show that cooperation is needed at the levels of both manufac-
turers and suppliers in the supply chain. If manufacturers and suppliers decide
to collaborate, then all members of the cluster will win. This win-win situation
is achieved if the shares are fairly distributed. Thus, Shapley value provides a
way for the companies to improve their current situation, and implies a positive
impact on their supply chain. In the competitive marketing environment, it is
quite difficult for a company (smaller or bigger) to compete independently with
other companies across the globe. The high debt indicators and low cash fluid-
ity of at least some of the companies considered are the obstacles to any form
of innovation in improving their business operations. Establishing cooperation
agreements among the different members of the chain will allow the cluster to
strengthen and eventually increase their joint competitive value.
The proposed model may be extended further by incorporating other per-
formance indicators that would likely increase the cluster’s competitive value.
Evaluation of both the quantitative and qualitative factors, which affect the
competitive value of the chain, can be incorporated in the future, so as to make
a complete analysis of cooperation throughout the entire cluster.
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